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Abstract
Many historians have looked at the interim period of the Baltic States between World
War I and World War II, and their independence movements. However, there are few
substantial works that look at the complex and interrelated histories of how Russian and
American foreign policy shaped the Baltic independence movements and subsequently gained
international recognition. This paper will try to address how and why the Baltic States were
able to gain and maintain their independence by external forces and then gain formal
recognition by the United States in 1922. To gain my results, I analyzed some of Lenin’s
translated writings on foreign policy, many relevant telegrams and letters published in the
National Archives of the U.S., and went through secondary sources from both American and
Baltic historians. I found that self-determination rhetoric, WWI, and the Russian Civil War were
the primary forces that allowed Baltic nationalists to fill the power vacuums created by those
same sources, and the stabilization period that followed made U.S. recognition a possibility. If
we can understand how and why Baltic independence was secured during the 1920s, we can
have a more thorough explanation of the role of the Baltic States in the collapse of the Soviet
Union during their Singing Revolutions.
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Introduction
When writing a historical background section for a symposium volume titled, “The Baltic
in International Relations between the Two World Wars” editors John Hiden and Aleksander
Loit provided a relatively concise and informative summary of the history of the Baltic States.
Concerning the 1920s, they wrote, “Internal instability caused by external intervention and civil
war ensured that Soviet Russia’s effort to retain the Baltic republics was not successful.”1 That
observation explains how the Baltic States were able to maintain their independence and did
not rejoin Russia. However, this statement needs to be expanded upon in order to holistically
comprehend the turbulent history of why and how Russia’s Western Provinces became three
independent Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with full U.S. de jure recognition.
External intervention and influence not only caused internal instability, but also
paradoxically created the conditions necessary for internal stability in favor of Baltic
independence. Self-determination rhetoric from Bolshevik Russian leaders and the U.S. fueled
independence and recognition movements. External intervention in the form of World War I’s
eastern front, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the Russian Civil War initially created chaotic and
unstable political conditions. Ultimately, those unstable internal conditions created the power
vacuums for stable nationalist institutions and governments to take form. Those same forces
that allowed for Baltic nationalists to take power became roadblocks toward U.S. recognition.
Formal recognition from the international community solidified the newfound internal stability
in the Baltic States as U.S. foreign policy toward the region changed in 1922.
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Since the beginning of the 19th century, the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania were a part of the Russian Empire. Peter the Great’s 19th century imperial conquests
of the territory gave Russia access to the Baltic Sea’s ports and new lands to add to the large
empire.2 The cultural awakenings of the late 19th century occurred in the Baltics after a long
period of Russification. Popular Baltic folklore, literature, and art reappeared along the Sea in
an attempt to revive the local culture. The differences between each state and more
importantly, between the Baltics and Russia, became clearer during this period.
Self-determination became a powerful revolutionary current after the 1880s as local
populations began to recognize the social and ethnic disparities in the region.3 In the Baltics,
class had everything to do with ethnicity, and the indigenous populations had been at the
bottom of the social ladder. While the Bolsheviks wrote of the need for Russia’s multi-ethnic
peoples to ignore calls for nationalism and instead focus on the oppression they face by the
bourgeoisie, they were ignoring the intertwined nature of class and ethnicity.4 Most of the
Baltic natives were still living in the agrarian countryside after the delayed renunciation of
serfdom. Increasingly, native Baltic peoples were starting to fill in the ranks of the new urban
class, the petty bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia with the spread of industrialization.5 Yet the
same generation that was experiencing mild social mobility was not so far removed from the
old class system in which only the Russians and the Germans held the higher social positions.
2
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The attack of the Bolsheviks on the new native middle class pushed them away from socialist
ideology and towards the center nationalists.6 The growing class of native Baltic urban
professionals would come to play a key role in championing the cause of their own national
self-determination.7 The sudden growth of this new class allowed them to become more
politicized so they could eventually have a say in forming their own state.
The Russian Revolution of 1905 and then the Russian Revolutions of 1917 saw the rise of
Baltic nationalism. The 1917 Russian Revolution changed Baltic calls for autonomy to ones of
independence. Declarations of independence based of self-determination principles brought
Baltic nationalist politicians to power as new governments formed along the Baltic Sea. As it
dominated the conversation on questions of nationality, self-determination rhetoric fueled the
fight for autonomy and independence. In both the U.S. and Russia, the rights of selfdetermination were professed and then echoed by different political factions in the Baltic
States, most notably, the nationalists. The consistent championing of the right to selfdetermination by President Woodrow Wilson consequentially caused Baltic nationalists to turn
to the U.S. for assistance and independence recognition.
World War I brought with it unstable political conditions that resulted in the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk. Its adoption had monumental effects for Baltic nationalists as it separated
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from Russia. Germany’s attempt to create Baltic puppet states
was however unsuccessful because the Allies overturned it 8 months later when Germany lost
the war. The end of WWI affected the Baltic independence movements from the Armistice to
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the Versailles Peace Treaty with numerous political factions claiming power. As German
soldiers left the Baltics, nationalist governments were left vulnerable to Russian invasion
without outside help. Baltic pleas for U.S. recognition that would safeguard their institutions
were ignored. U.S. foreign policy toward Russia and the Baltics was also framed during this
time period and stubbornly insisted on non-recognition. The U.S. would not recognize Soviet
Russia because of the Bolshevik presence, but its decision to not recognize nationalist Baltic
governments that filled the power vacuum was rooted in its allegiance to White Russians
claiming the old Empire’s territorial integrity be maintained.
The Russian Civil War as it occurred in the Baltic States showed how both White Russian
and American diplomats worked together to stall recognition. The signing of peace treaties
between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Baltic nationalists brought back internal stability. This
time, governments representative of the indigenous population were at the head of this
stability. Such a turn of events in each of the Baltic States allowed dedicated supporters of
Baltic independence to finally gain de jure recognition by the United States. The 1920 election
that forced a change in administration, along with a stable period of nationalist rule in the
Baltics allowed for the extension of full recognition.
This paper will be organized into five chapters that look at the interplay of forces
between Russia, the United States, and the Baltic States in terms of how they contributed to
Baltic independence and U.S. recognition. The first chapter will look at how self-determination
rhetoric fueled nationalist movements around 1917 and shaped independence declarations.
The chapter begins with an examination of the Bolshevik party’s definition of self-
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determination and then moves to how those principles spread to the Baltic Provinces through
the Provisional Government and subsequent independence declarations after the 1917 October
Russian Revolution. It concludes with an attempted explanation as to why and how the Baltic
States looked to the U.S. for support of their right to self-determination. The second chapter
tries to explain the importance of WWI as an external intervention on Baltic instability that
created power vacuums. The effect of the October Russian Revolution and subsequent
Bolshevik power struggles, particularly in Latvia, are also examined. The chapter ends with a
look at the ongoing negotiations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by the Bolshevik Russians and its
result in the Baltic States. The third chapter outlines how the external intervention that
allowed Baltic nationalists to come to power was also the impetus for the U.S. non-recognition
policy. It begins with the arguments used by Russian governments to claim the Baltic Provinces
as their own, looks at the connection between those arguments and the formation of U.S.
policy toward the Baltics, mentions the arguments used against propping up Baltic buffer
states, and ends with the importance of White Russian influence in America. The fourth
chapter examines the Russian Civil War as it occurred in the Baltic States. A large portion of the
chapter is dedicated to showing how the Armistice and Versailles Peace Treaty expanded the
Civil War into the Baltics as instability grew with myriad armed groups vying for political
influence. The White Russian arguments used to defer U.S. recognition are expanded upon,
paying special attention to the economic arguments stated by the Russian Ambassador to the
U.S., Boris Bakhmetev. U.S. policy is revisited in response to chaotic conditions in the Baltic
States throughout 1920 and 1921. This chapter also mentions White Russian losses as the Civil
War continues due to the successful rejection of White Russian influence in the Baltics
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culminating in Baltic-Soviet peace treaties. The fifth chapter is dedicated to the last two years
of the battle for de jure recognition from the U.S. It starts out with failed attempts at de facto
recognition, and moves to the 1920 election, after which unofficial Baltic representatives were
allowed to stay in America and Consuls were set up in each Baltic State. The roles of
Commissioner Young in Riga, private U.S. firms, and American citizens and domestic
representatives are highlighted. Ambassador Bakhmetev’s resignation and recognition from
the international community is summarized and then revisited with an exploration of the
domestic pressure that influenced Hughes to extend full recognition.
Throughout this paper I make mention of various political groups in the U.S. and the
Baltic States. This was done intentionally as a representation of the confusion and uncertainty
Baltic nationalists faced when looking into the future of their states. For convenience, I have
limited the number of groups mentioned and used some names interchangeably, although that
should not diminish their importance. For example, different political institutions such as the
Latvian National Council, the guberniya, and the National Council of Lithuania comprised of
different democratically elected representatives of various political parties are later rebranded
as just the “Baltic nationalists.” Under different names, many political groups were seeking
Estonian, Latvian, or Lithuanian independence and U.S. recognition but they all had the same
overarching goals, so I used the general name of Baltic nationalists to include all of them. It
should be noted that the Lithuanian National Council also went by the name of the Taryba,
even while under German influence. Lastly, the different spelling of Estonia, either with or
without the letter “h” was chosen based on the source. Most U.S. State Department records
use the “Esthonia” spelling while others do not. The inconsistency is also present in this paper.
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Chapter 1: The Power of Self-Determination
To understand the attitudes of self-determination in the Baltics, Lenin’s position on the
nationality question must be understood. After some nationalist uprisings in the late 1800s and
the intensity of the 1905 Russian Revolution in the Baltics, Bolshevik theorists had to address
the nationality question. Lenin started to address the issue in 1913. He clearly stated his
position in support of the rights of all peoples to separate from Russia. One passage from his
writings that shows this idea explicitly states, “as regards the national question, the proletarian
party must, first of all, insist on the promulgation and immediate realization of full freedom of
separation from Russia for all nations and peoples who were oppressed by Tsarism.”8 Bolshevik
ideology was against nationalism, oppression, and annexations. This meant that they would
need to defend maintaining the Baltic Provinces in the Russian Empire while championing
contradictory ideas.
Whilst supporting a large multi-ethnic communist state, Lenin was condemning large
multi-ethnic empires; those ideas seem to contradict one another. In Lenin’s October 25th,
1917 “Decree on Peace” speech at the All Russian Congress of Soviets, he exclaimed, “if any
nation is kept within the frontiers of another state by violence…to decide without the least
compulsion the question of the form of its state existence, then holding on to such a nation is
annexation, i.e., seizure and violence.”9 His ideological disagreement with the multi-ethnic
empires of the time stemmed from the fact that those ethnic minority states were annexed.
That was the fundamental difference between his idea of a large state and the multi-ethnic
8
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empires already in existence. Lenin defined annexation by including all of the subject peoples
of Russia.10 I agree with Stanley Page’s perspective that Lenin’s attitude “created the
impression that he stood for complete dissolution of the Russian Empire into its component
feudal parts.”11 By defining annexations in such a manner, Lenin makes it seem as if he does
not support keeping any annexed nation within the Empire and supports independence for all
of those national minorities, such as the different ethnic groups living in the Baltics.12
In the end, Lenin sought to reconcile nationalism and self-determination with
international Marxism. Lenin showed his optimism in the success of a large soviet state when
he wrote: “The proletarian party strives to create as large a state as possible, for this is in the
interests of the workers; it strives to bring the nations closely together, to fuse them but it
intends to bring that about not by the use of force, but only by a free brotherly union of the
workers and the toiling masses of all the nations.”13 Lenin wanted to create such a communist
state without force, and evidently believed that although nationality and self-determination
were important, states would voluntarily give up some of their own sovereignty to join a free
brotherly union of the workers under Petrograd’s central rule. Lenin’s solution to the national
question was to incorporate those ideas of international Marxism so that all nations would
unite under centralized rule, and give up nationalistic ambitions.
The ideological goals of self-determination gained explicit recognition and support at
the meeting of the Council of People’s Commissars on November 15, 1917. At this meeting, the
10
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Council announced the self-determination of the nations of Russia.14 The meeting produced
the “Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia” signed “in the name of the Russian
Republic, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, V. Ulianov. People’s Commissar on
Nationality Affairs, Josef Dzhugashvili.”15 The document began with mention of “emancipation”
of workmen and peasants, and then led into the evils of the Tsarist regime for inciting the
peoples of Russia against one another; something Lenin thought his government would not
have to do to maintain the large state because annexed lands would want to join the workers’
utopia Russia was supposed to become. The language used to describe the people of Russia as
just now “being emancipated from the hateful shackles” provides readers the sharp contrast
between the prior regimes and the new Bolshevik rule as a government that is against
imprisoning its people.16 The end of the declaration summed up the Council’s views on the
question of Russia’s nationalities in four principles: all people of Russia are sovereign and equal,
people of Russia have the right to free self-determination, “even to the point of separation and
the formation of an independent state,” all national privileges are disabled, and national
minorities and ethnographic groups can freely develop.17 Lenin simultaneously championed the
right of all people to secede from Russia and denounced the century long practice of national
privileges while calling for a strong centralized proletarian state.
Bolshevik speeches and declarations had strong notions of self-determination that
spread to the Baltics as did the Bolshevik influence in government even before the October
14
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Russian Revolution. The Latvian governing bodies in particular, were heavily influenced by
Leninist ideas. According to Andrew Ezergailis, “by July 1917 the Latvian Bolsheviks had almost
complete control of the Workers’, Soldiers’, and Landless Peasants’ Soviets in Latvia.”18 The
same calls for self-determination that were uttered by Lenin were repeated by local political
groups, and spread ideas that the local population can and should chose their fate, and by
extension, their own form of government.
Before the Bolshevist coup, the fall of the tsar led to an attempted autonomous district
of Livonia in modern day Latvia. The existing ruling institutions of the tsarist regime of
administration collapsed after the February Revolution, and the new government’s authority
was questioned as Baltic calls for self-determination took form. Kerensky’s government was
too weak to prevent the creation of administrative bodies in Livonia even though he refused to
recognize an autonomous Latvia.19 The provisional government was pre-occupied with the
political power struggle with Petrograd’s Bolsheviks and the war, so it ”could not prevent
trained Latvians from assuming most of the duties of administration or from creating an
independent Governmental Council in South Livonia.”20 This development allowed for Latvia’s
political leaders and population to recognize that they are not fully dependent on Russia. South
Livonia’s Governmental Council was not officially recognized as the autonomous government of
Latvia, but it acted as the central government in the small unoccupied area.21 They were

18

Andrew Ezergailis, The 1917 Revolution in Latvia (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1974), 105.
Kaslas, The Baltic Nations, 49.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
19

13

responsible for maintaining a general sense of public order in the chaotic region just miles from
the German army, showcasing the first example of autonomous rule in Latvia.22
The Provisional government in Petrograd was unable to maintain its authority in Estonia
as well. Demonstrating their approval for ideas of self-determination, the Estonian nationalist
and socialist leaders asked for autonomy. Approximately 150,000 Estonians paraded through
Petrograd in front of the Tauride Palace demanding autonomy.23 The Decree of March 30, 1917
by the Provisional Government granted Estonia the right to autonomous self-government.24
Estonia would now learn to function as an autonomous territory; the precursor for
independence because there would already be a historical precedent of self-rule in place. New
government institutions were created with Estonian national leaders, such as Jean Poska as the
High Commissioner. The new law allowed the formation of an Estonian National Council (called
“guberniya” by the Russians) to preside over Estonia and the northern part of Livonia.25 These
actions “brought de facto recognition of autonomy in Estonia,” for the very first time.26 The
clause of the Provisional Government’s decree that best described the newly gained
autonomous powers is written as follows:
The guberniya commissar, together with the temporary guberniya zemstvo council, shall
be responsible for: a) management of the affairs of local self-government in the

22
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guberniya and of the zemstvo economy, b) management of affairs of the general
administration…general zemstvo taxes on the basis of existing laws…27
Estonia had never existed as a state or an autonomous area. It used to be part of Livland or
Livonia, so creating autonomous government institutions was a big step towards independence.
Autonomous rule gave Estonian political leaders some experience with self-determination that
would be echoed in their independence declarations.
Both American and Russian touting of self-determination for small nations were
repeated in the Baltic independence declarations. One such national minority that declared
independence on the basis of self-determination on November 29, 1917 was Lithuania.28 The
Lithuanian National Council’s declaration echoed the same principles that Lenin had been
preaching about the evils of annexation and the right of self-determination. It read:
In consideration of the fact that Lithuania was annexed to Russia by force and has never
ceased to demand independence, even by armed force…that it has been shamefully
oppressed and mistreated by the Tsarist government for 120 years…the National
Council of Lithuania…declares that the Lithuanian nation considers itself free and
unconstrained by any ties with the Russian state.29
The Lithuanian manifesto uses similar language to Lenin’s “Decree on Peace” by stating that
there were violent tactics used to maintain the province, which makes it annexation as defined

27
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by Lenin. A very similar resolution that also used self-determination based language was
passed by the Estonian National Council after the October Russian Revolution. Once local
Estonian Soviets briefly took power in Tallinn, the Council met on November 28, 1917. It
passed a resolution proclaiming it the supreme power:
On the basis of the self determination of nations…whereas in Russia the state
power…has been completely destroyed and no central authority exists which the
subdivisions of the state could obey…the Estonian Maanoukogu [National Council]
proclaims that…it has the sole supreme power to enact laws and regulations which all in
Estonia must obey.30
By using similar language and definitions of annexation, these declarations serve as examples of
how the same notions of self-determination perpetuated by the Russian Bolsheviks were used
by the Baltic States in their independence movements.
From the American perspective, the start of the Great War also began the Baltic pleas
for the United States to take action on the side of Baltic self-determination. Due to the large
number of Lithuanians in America after the Lithuanian diaspora, a logical place to begin asking
for outside help was in the United States. The use of petitions by Baltic descendants in the U.S.
began before the U.S. joined the Allies in World War I. The first American-Lithuanian petition
that was brought before Wilson’s attention came during the Spring of 1915. It contained one

30

Cited in Karl Aun, “The 1917 Revolution and the Idea of the State in Estonia,” in Quellen und Studien zur
baltischen Geschichte: Die baltischen Provinzen Russlands zwischen den Revolutionen von 1905 und 1917 (Köln:
Böhlau Verlag GmbH, 1982), 291.

16

million signatures urging American support of an autonomous Lithuanian state.31 Thus, Wilson
was aware that problems were arising in Russia’s Baltic Provinces and those problems would
have to be dealt with after the war.32 The following year, the Lithuanian Alliance of America
reflected the local change in demands from autonomy to independence. On June 10th, they
adopted a resolution asking the U.S. government to recognize their right “to be independent
and to choose any form of government which these races consider best suited to
themselves.”33 They were asking the U.S. government to recognize their right to selfdetermination.
The Lithuanians and other Baltic nationalist governments had reason to believe that
Woodrow Wilson may help in their nationalist cause because of early signs of support. In 1916,
during the midst of the fighting, Wilson supported the House of Representatives in issuing a
proclamation setting November 1st as “Lithuania Day.”34 The proclamation states that
November 1st will be “a day upon which the people of the United States may make
contributions as they feel disposed for the aid of the stricken Lithuanian people.”35 This help
was intended for the war stricken area and did not necessarily mean that the U.S. government
supported a state of Lithuania. However, Wilson proclaimed November 1st as “Lithuania Day,”
not “Western Russia Day.” This acknowledgement of the existence of a “Lithuania” by both the
legislative and executive branch of the U.S. government, even before the Treaty of Brest-
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Litovsk, was significant. It was a sign that a big and influential Western power knew such a
place existed and was willing to extend help, even if it was only through monetary humanitarian
aid.
Due to the popularity of Wilson’s championing of the rights of small nations, both
Estonia and Lithuania announced their declarations of independence to diplomatic
representatives of the U.S. in advance.36 Although Washington had received some requests for
support of Lithuanian independence, the first active step toward seeking recognition based on
self-determination was a proclamation by the Taryba forwarded to D.C. on February 9, 1918.37
Both Secretary of State Robert Lansing and President Woodrow Wilson received letters from
the Taryba with their declaration of independence and a request for recognition.38 The Taryba
proclaimed:
…the restoration of a Lithuanian independent state, with Vilnius for its capitals and the
freeing of that state from all bonds whatever they may be previously entered into with
or forced upon by the neighboring states… It has an existence of its own which is only
waiting for international recognition in order to become fully sovereign.39
Contrary to the State Department’s wishes, Lithuania’s position, as well as that of the other two
Baltic State, was made clear and former U.S. hopes of an autonomous state in a federal Russia
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were pushed aside. Now the State Department had to deal with demands that the right to selfdetermination be upheld.
President Wilson’s non recognition policy surprised the hopeful Baltic diplomats. This
shock was primarily caused by Wilson’s contradictory self-determination policy for which he
claimed all people have a right to. Zigfrids Meierovics, Latvia’s Foreign Minister at the time,
sums up the general Baltic sentiment when he says, “it was to be expected that the United
States would be the first to recognize the national states which were coming to make use of the
principles proclaimed by President Wilson.”40 Not formally recognizing the independence of
the Baltic States seemed like, and essentially was, a contradiction of Wilson’s esteemed
principles of self-determination.
Chapter 2: WWI and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
World War I brought with it many external forces that created unstable conditions in
the Baltics. As a part of the eastern front, the Baltic States gained a new opportunity for
nationalist aspirations. Whilst fighting for a losing Russian Army, Baltic allegiance to the
Russian throne and Provisional Government were tested. Oncoming German soldiers caused
massive evacuations and the presence of both Russian soldiers alongside German soldiers
further complicated the Baltic political situation. The removal of the Kerensky administration
by the Bolsheviks in Russia was mirrored in the Baltics even though they were preoccupied with
a German invasion. Troublesome negotiations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk were yet another
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external factor that had important consequences for the Baltics by separating the region from
Russia.
As a part of the Russian Empire, Baltic soldiers fought alongside Russian troops in World
War I. The eastern front was primarily on Latvian soil. Latvian and Russian soldiers showed
their initial solidarity by fighting against German forces together, as a united multiethnic state.
About 180,000 Latvians were serving in the Russian army at the onset of WWI.41 Although the
frontline eventually went all the way to Petrograd’s circumference, causing the Bolsheviks to
relocate to Moscow, most of the fighting and local damages were inflicted upon Baltic soil. This
made the locals even more aware of the devastating situation caused by the war than their
larger and stronger Russian cousins.42 War weariness brought about beliefs that any regime
change would improve their situation, whether it was brought about by Lenin’s promise of
bread and peace, or secession from a warring government.
As in any war torn area, the Baltics experienced political chaos as a result of World War
I, but also had to deal with regime change following the Russian Revolutions. The front line
literally separated the Baltics from Petrograd’s leadership battle by battle, creating an
opportunity for independence that had not existed before. The political groups that stayed
behind would now become the forces of change. Historian Tönu Parming notes, “the 1917
Revolutions in Russia resulted in the appearance of a large vacuum in governmental authority,
the collapse of centralized political power. The tsarist state and its successors were in chaos,
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and in the Baltic unable to cope with the military encroachments of the Kaiser’s Germany.”43 By
1915, all of Lithuania and the province of Kurland were occupied. German armies continued to
push into Russia’s Baltic Provinces with the fall of Tsar Nicholas II and kept getting close to Riga
once the February Revolution propped up the Provisional Government.
The chaotic conditions of the war met with evacuations that created new opportunities
for leadership. Approximately half of Latvia’s population left between 1915 and 1917.44
Approaching German armies and retreating Russian soldiers ravaged the area and split Latvia
apart between German occupied territory and land still controlled by Russia’s central
government. Some Latvians and Lithuanians left the Baltic Sea area for inner Russia to escape
German rule.45 The moving frontline was followed by an influx of Russian soldiers into the
region to defend Russia’s borders. Due to the war effort continuing even after the February
Revolution, large numbers of Russian troops were stationed in the area, having an input in local
disputes. Tönu Parming explains that in both Latvia and Estonia, “a sizable proportion of the
radical left consisted of non-natives, generally Russians, both in the ranks of industrial workers,
as Baltic industry expanded to fill tsarist war-production needs, and in the ranks of the
military.”46 Those soldiers brought with them the sociopolitical ideas and developments from
inner Russia to its periphery.
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After toppling the Provisional Government during the October Revolution, Lenin and his
followers had to find a way out of WWI. An armistice was concluded between Imperial
Germany and Bolshevik Russia at the beginning of December, 1917 and peace negotiations
began shortly afterwards. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was negotiated by Trotsky, the Bolshevik
government’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and tried to keep in line with Bolshevik rhetoric
but failed in that aspect. During the negotiations, Trotsky asked for a peace without
annexations because they were inherently conflicting with Bolshevik principles of selfdetermination mentioned earlier.
The fact that the Bolsheviks had control over the leadership in the Baltics is just that, a
fact. After the October Revolution, soviet governments sprang up in Estonia and the
unoccupied provinces of Latvia, but they were short-lived because of advancing German armies
and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.47 Lenin’s peace at any cost tactics sacrificed an area in which his
own party already had consolidated a lot of power after the October Revolution. Yet they did
face some opposition with the growing power of nationalists using self-determination as cause
for secession. In war torn and separated Latvia, the Bolsheviks repeatedly reminded their
supporters that, “the success of a socialist revolution in Latvia depended on the victorious
emergence of a socialist revolution in the whole of Russia.”48 In his writings, Latvian Bolshevik
leader Peteris Štucka said that Latvia depended on Russia, but even he made the distinction

47

James D. White, “Nationalism and Socialism in Historical Perspective,” in The Baltic States: the National SelfDetermination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, ed. Graham Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 32-33.
48
Sigurds Ziemelis, “Latvia on the Way to October: The Role of the Latvian Social Democratic Party in the Victory of
the Socialist Revolution,” in Quellen und Studien zur baltischen Geschichte: Die baltischen Provinzen Russlands
zwischen den Revolutionen von 1905 und 1917 (Köln: Böhlau Verlag GmbH, 1982), 261.

22

between Latvia and Russia; they were two distinct and separate areas. Such hints would
indicate that he viewed Latvia as autonomous, even while a part of socialist Russia.
The Latvian Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Peteris Štucka, saw the nationality
question as something to be worked on within the framework of proletarian internationalism
and close ties to the Russian government. The Latvian Social Democratic party was composed
of mainly Bolsheviks, and had strong connections to Lenin and the Petrograd Bolsheviks.
Andrew Ezergailis, wrote about the differences between the 1905 and 1917 revolutions in
Latvia, pointing out that the Social Democrats were the largest Latvian party and “had
reoriented their thinking away from national concerns to social ones”49 However, that does not
mean that national concerns were erased by any means. The Latvian Bolsheviks “adhered to
the ideology of friendship among nations, relying on V.I. Lenin’s theory on national problems
and proletarian internationalism.”50 The connection between Latvian political leaders and
Lenin made them push for a centralized state, and not ask for independence while they
remained in power. Štucka wrote in “Nacionalais jautajums un latviesu proletariats,” “we love
a Russian, Jewish, Estonian, Lithuanian etc. worker not because he is a Russian, Jew, etc., but
because he is a worker. Such is the faith of Latvia’s communists regarding the nationality
question.”51 On a very similar note, Štucka also wrote, “we are against all nationalism… only
those who can become enthusiastic about national federations have not understood, or do not
want to understand the significance of class struggle.”52 This is how the Latvian Bolsheviks tried
to solve the nationality question in Latvia the same way Lenin did in Russia; by emphasizing that
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the struggle was over class rather than nationality, even though the two categories were
intertwined.
The German invasion allowed Latvian nationalists the opportunity to call for
independence. Russian troops abandoned their posts and socialist Latvian forces that were
outnumbered yet unwilling to surrender to German troops retreated to inner Russia.53 Russian
leaders headed back eastward and “at this critical moment removed the last vestiges of the
authority of the Russian state in the Baltic Provinces.”54 Reformist nationalists had less Russian
and Latvian Bolsheviks around to preach the benefits of a centralized workers’ state led by
Petrograd. The fleeing of many radicalized Russians meant that there would be less opposition
to Baltic independence. The Bolsheviks were losing their constituencies in the occupied areas,
making united Baltic and Russian soviet governments unlikely. The nationalist reformers that
stayed behind, and with some émigrés, were able to call for the creation of their own state.55
Before the peace treaty was negotiated, guarantees against German aggression were
yet another concern for Baltic nationalists. In 1918, the Baltic States were saturated with both
German, and Red Army soldiers. German ploys to create puppet states on the coast were
rumored and seemed to be true. An example of this occurred when an Estonian member of the
Constituent Assembly came to a British Foreign Minister in Petrograd seeking British advice and
protection. The Germans allegedly offered to guarantee Estonian independence if the
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nationalist forces were to accept a German protectorate.56 Presumably, the Germans either
would or already have made similar offers to both Latvian and Lithuanian nationalists as well.57
This was a familiar predicament- the choice between German or Russian rule. Fear of German
aggression made the Baltics turn to the West for recognition, and thereby protection, while
German wishes for puppet states made the Western nations suspicious of the real agents of
power in the proclaimed independent republics.
In charge of Russian foreign affairs, Trotsky handled the negotiations and tried to stretch
out talks to provide more time for an international communist revolution. The Bolsheviks
believed the proletariat revolution would spread to the Central Powers from their Western
Provinces, especially to industrialized Germany.58 Keeping the Baltic Provinces not only would
have given the Bolsheviks more territory to rule over, but also would be a possible influence on
neighboring Germany and Scandinavia. On February 10, 1918 Trotsky made an unheard-of
diplomatic move by not signing the peace treaty while simultaneously announcing
demobilization.59 Trotsky tried to solve his dilemma of waiting for a proletariat revolution in
Germany while dealing with a world war with the “neither-peace-nor-war” solution.60 Unhappy
with Trotsky’s bold move, Germany continued its war effort once more by moving its armies
further into Russia on February 18, 1918.61 Lenin wanted an immediate peace treaty with
Germany so he could fulfill his promise of ending the war. Frustrated with the peace
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negotiations, Lenin pushed for making a final peace, even if that meant allowing Germany to
annex its former territory, the Baltic Provinces, while German soldiers marched northward.
Facing the inevitable approach of German forces and power struggles with Soviets, the
nationalist Estonian government declared independence. Before German soldiers took Tallinn,
Konstantin Päts, Jüri Vilms and Konstantin Konik, Estonian politicians on behalf of the Estonian
National Council, declared the existence of an independent Estonia on February 23, 1918.62
Facing an approaching frontline without having adequate defensive forces made such a
declaration easier, and seemingly futile, for the National Council because they had nothing to
lose. The German army was going to occupy Estonia anyway, so the declaration stood as just a
formally stated position of how the Estonians now thought of themselves; as an independent
entity, separate from the Russian Empire.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was seen as a humiliating defeat to the Bolsheviks, but Lenin
argued for it to pass because it was necessary to end the German invasion. Lenin issued the
“Decree on the Socialist Fatherland in Danger” after German armies kept advancing once peace
talks paused and the army was too close to Petrograd.63 On February 23, 1918, the Germans
laid out their terms for peace, demanding all of the territory its troops had seized, including the
Baltics. In the end, the Baltic Bolsheviks that managed to escape German invasion were
betrayed by their leaders in Petrograd by the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. “Some
Latvian Rifles even threatened an independent war against the Germans if Lenin concluded that
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peace.”64 Reminiscing upon his time in power, Štucka, “made clear that his party had never
really become reconciled to the notion of a separate state. He stressed they had never used
the slogan 'an independent Latvia' because they laughed at the very notion; 'in the era of
imperialism', he reminded his readers, 'the independence of tiny nations was nothing more
than a diplomatic deception, while in the era of socialism it would be quite unnecessary.'”65
Bolshevik leaders in the Baltics wanted a centralized Russian state under their control, but the
treaty would legally bind the Baltics to Germany. Rather than become a “diplomatic
deception,” the independence of those small states as a result of the Peace Treaty took away
long-standing Russian influences that had possessed the sole juridical rights of sovereignty.66
The formal separation of the Baltic States was brought about by World War I and the
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The peace treaty was signed on March 3, 1918 with a significant loss for
Russia. The Bolsheviks agreed to give up 1,267,000 square miles of territory with 62 million
people in it.67 The legal separation of the Baltic States from Russia is evident in Article III, which
states that the, “territories lying to the west of the line agreed upon by the contracting parties
which formerly belonged to Russia, will no longer be subject to Russian sovereignty.”68 The
Soviet Executive passed the peace proposal by a vote of 116 to 85 even though Lenin was called
a “traitor” from the Left SRs, a Russian political group, and some members on the left wing of
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his own party.69 The treaty isolated the remaining Bolsheviks in the Baltics, which allowed for
nationalist reformers in the area to form their own government institutions under limited
German protection.
Chapter 3: The Peace Conference Formation of U.S. Foreign Policy
Initial U.S. policy towards the Baltics formed during WWI. That policy was founded by
the external forces that allowed Baltic nationalists to come to power. The (White) Russian
Ambassador in the U.S. and certain American diplomats once more changed the Baltic political
situation. Before the Peace Conference, Baltic pleas for international recognition of their
independence were neglected as U.S. policy in the region revolved around their optimistic
prediction of a White Russian victory in the ensuing Civil War. At the Peace Conference, the
Allied Powers nullified the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and once again that external action brought
about more chaos in the Baltics. The presence of German troops, more favorable to Baltic
nationalists than Russian troops, had maintained a small amount of Baltic stability because it
kept the Russian Civil War, and the Red Army soldiers that came with it, away from the coast.
The retreat of German soldiers is what caused internal instability to flare up again and the Civil
War to expand, but it ultimately stopped the Baltics from becoming German puppet states.
It took the United States four years after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to extend full
recognition to the Baltic States because the U.S. had close ties with Russia during WWI.
Individual U.S. diplomats had different view on the independence of the Baltic States and
chaotic political conditions made it difficult to understand which faction was in charge. Most
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importantly, the U.S. believed that Russia would shed Bolshevism rather quickly and become a
large and powerful state, which included the Baltics, once more.
The prevalence of certain Russian diplomats, such as Boris Bakhmetev, also slowed
down the recognition process. Before the October Revolution, Kerensky’s ambassador to the
United States paid a visit to Washington on July 7th. Bakhmetev “made it immediately clear
that neither mutual affection nor trust would prevail if the U.S. started advocating
dismemberment of Russia.”70 In response, Baltic representatives claimed that they should be
able to decide their own fate.71 However, they had yet to declare independence and would not
have legitimate institutions that allowed for their self-government until the aftermath of the
October Revolution.
Arguments by each Russian government for retention of the Baltic States were strategic
as well as economic, appealing to America’s need for a strong Russian ally and a peaceful
Europe. This was done primarily by pitting the Baltics as necessary for defense against further
German aggression. Although Russian aggression in the area was evident to the Baltic
nationalists and they tried to make it as obvious to the State Department, Germany’s aggressive
tendencies were cause for more concern in the aftermath of WWI. The Tsarist, Provisional, and
Bolshevik governments all argued that the retention of the Baltic littoral was critical for Russia
for two main reasons: “1, the Baltic area could be used as a springboard for aggression against
Russia, and 2, its possession by Russia provided an indispensable security zone for her.”72 It is
difficult to determine whether each Russian government actually believed the Baltic States
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were so important, but the argument was that the Baltics were inseparable from Russia
because secession would undermine its national defense.
Those closest to the region, i.e. the local Baltic population, knew that the area was not
critical for Russia’s national defense by their experience during World War I. Although Kaiser
Wilhelm’s Imperial Army came close to Petrograd, the war left Russia proper in-tact. In the
winter of 1918, a demoralized German Army was able to capture 1172 Bolshevik officers and
16,000 enlisted men in the Livonia and Estonia region, with only 20 killed and wounded soldiers
of their own.73 No strategic military reversals occurred in the Baltic States. For an area that it
considered so critical for self-defense, it seems puzzling that Russia would not be willing to
properly defend the Baltic defense zone that allowed the German Army to cross all of Lithuania
and Kurland, to the Daugava River outside of Riga in just one campaign in 1915.74 Resistance
was so low in this esteemed Russian buffer, that, “in Kurland, German cavalry patrols took
whole towns virtually without firing a shot.”75 The Baltics were more like a playground for
soldiers to intersect and burn land when a direction, either towards or away from Russia or
Germany, was already established by decisive battles elsewhere.
America’s ties with Russia hindered any willingness the U.S. may have had to recognize
the new republics. Immediate difficulties for recognition were directly related to Russia’s role
in World War I. Albert Tarulis explains that, “were there U.S. to support openly the separatist
tendencies among the non-Russians, it would have lost not only Russian friendship, but also
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Russian military contribution to the common struggle against Germany and her allies.”76 It was
clearly not in the interest of the United States to upset an ally. The obvious focus was on
winning the Great War and Russian soldiers were necessary, so Russia could not be abandoned.
To help configure U.S. policy toward Russia, Elihu Root was sent on a diplomatic mission during
the summer of 1917. He confirmed the idea that if the U.S. showed sympathy for Russia and
did not support its dismemberment, he expected that Russia would stay in the war.77 All of this
occurred before the October Russian Revolution, before Russia left the war. However, U.S.
policy of supporting Russia’s interests remained the same. The U.S. still would not openly
support Russia’s dismemberment after its role in WWI diminished.
America’s determination to have close ties with Russia was expressed even after the
Bolsheviks made a separate peace. Exemplifying the close knit relationship, in 1918, U.S.
Ambassador Francis stated,
I shall not leave Russia until forced to depart. My Government and the American people
are too deeply interested in the welfare of the Russian people to abandon the country
and leave its people to the mercles [SIC] of Germany. We shall do all possible…to
protect and preserve the integrity of this great country.78
Even when Russia was no longer aiding the Allies in Germany’s defeat, the U.S. maintained its
determination to have an ally in Russia.
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Robert Lansing’s downplaying of the situation in the Baltics and his optimism in Great
Russia’s revival became the bedrock of America’s “do-nothing policy.” Albert Tarulis asserts,
“Lansing was aware of the centrifugal forces at work in Russia, but belittled them.”79 He, like
Wilson, seemed to think that the Baltic question would answer itself quickly. Lansing’s
diplomatic capabilities went beyond mere deferment as evidenced by his work as Secretary of
State after the end of the Great War. However, his policy, as well as Colby’s, maintained one of
deferment until the question would answer itself. Since he thought that Russia was only
temporarily disintegrated, deferment seemed like the only logical solution.80 The rise of the
Bolsheviks and the October Russian Revolution surprised the Western world, so it seemed
natural that such a strange force would not last long and the Russia the U.S. was familiar with,
an Ally during wartime, would soon return. In his war memoirs, Lansing wrote that he
suggested a “do nothing policy,” “until the black period of terrorism ends and the rising tide of
blood has run its course,” and in the meantime, America should “see to it that Russia’s interests
are safeguarded.”81 After all, he did not want to involve the United States in more of Europe’s
conflicts than he had to as isolationism’s popularity rose.82 It made no sense to focus on some
tiny Baltic States seeking independence recognition when Germany had to be defeated and
Western Europe had to be taken care of.
Lansing’s views on the relationship between Russia and the Baltic States cemented U.S.
policy during his term. He made up his mind September 9, 1918 before the war was over, that

79

Tarulis, American-Baltic Relations, 21.
Ibid., 22.
81
Cited in Ibid.
82
David S. Foglesong, America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism (Cahpel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1995), 235.
80

32

the Baltic States should be, “autonomous states of a Russian confederation, and that the BrestLitovsk peace treaty should be completely abrogated or denounced along with all treaties
relating to Russian territory.”83 As Secretary of State, Lansing’s views of the proper role of the
Baltics were critical, and with Wilson’s approval, were the official expressed views of the
American government. He saw an autonomous Baltic region within a strong Russia as a suitable
solution. Theoretically, it could have appeased Baltic nationalists while not interfering with the
strength of a Russian ally. The idea of a confederation was less likely to displease the Russians,
“who were inclined to concede to the Baltic peoples no more than a weak autonomy.”84 Once
established, such views remained until Lansing’s resignation. On October 5, 1918, Lansing
assured Bakhmetev that the position of his government had not changed and its objective was
to assist Russia.85 In the conflict between the Baltic nationalists and Russians who wanted to
maintain their territorial integrity, Lansing’s allegiance was with Russia, and Bakhmetev.
Certain U.S. officials held different views of the role the Baltics could play in
international politics that would support their independence. One such role the Baltic States
could, and were willing to, play was that of a buffer state. Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene,
Chief of the U.S. Mission to the Baltic Provinces, thought the Baltic States would make a great
buffer between two rivals, Russia and Germany.86 The delicate balance of power checking
European ambitions after World War I was just that- delicate. In trying to solve the Baltic
problem, the council of foreign Ministers decided to send food, equipment, and arms to the
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Baltic States at the end of 1919.87 Yet the idea of buffer states to dampen any further
annexationist wishes was appealing. Not only did Germany invade Russia, but Russian troops
also invaded East Prussia through the Nemunas River and moved towards Konigsberg and
Danzig during the first couple months of WWI.88 Recent aggressive tendencies that went
through Baltic lands were not only from the side of the Germans, so they were prime
contestants for buffer states between powerful neighbors. Greene’s support of Baltic buffer
states was also embedded in checking Bolshevik expansion.89 Claims of an international
proletariat revolution were reason enough to support efforts to the contrary. Although no one
in the State Department was in favor of Bolshevik expansion, they continued to believe the
communist revolution would end on its own accord and was not a real threat CITE. U.S. foreign
policy only acknowledged the Russia of 1917, and therefore any attempt toward recognition
without a powerful Russian government that the U.S. recognized would be futile.90 The
proximity of Greene’s position to Soviet Russia made him more afraid of the Bolsheviks, and
therefore more supportive of independent Baltic States, than U.S. diplomats sitting behind their
desks at the State Department, far removed from any Red Army soldiers.
America’s wish for a strong Russia even put the country at odds with Great Britain when
it came to the question of the Baltic States. American support of Baltic independence would
make the U.S. assume “moral responsibility for their protection” and further British trade
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disguised as buffer states.91 Siding with the British in setting up a Baltic buffer zone would
neither help U.S. economic interest nor their diplomatic relations with non-Bolshevik Russia. In
response to suggestions of Russia’s dismemberment to prevent a Bolshevik Russian menace,
Lansing replied with a strong moral and strategic pro-Russian stance. Referencing Lloyd
George’s idea of extending recognition to form an anti-Bolshevik alliance of independent states
from Estonia to the Caucasus, Lansing claimed it would be “a moral wrong and would pave the
way for conflicts in the future.”92 More importantly to U.S. interests, Lansing wrote, “a divided
Russia… would be a far greater menace to the British Empire than would be a united
democratic Russia, well able to defend itself, but not disposable to attack.”93 Such reminders of
a need for a strong Russia that the U.S. can count on as an ally broadly rejected other
approaches toward the Bolsheviks, like the formation of a chain of independent states.
The Russian Ambassador made his feelings about the separatist Baltic States known
once again before the Peace Conference. Although no reply was given, Bakhmetev was a
recognized Russian diplomat and that role alone made his voice in D.C. heard. Although Russia
was in a Civil War, Bakhmetev was invited to present the Russian view on the Treaty of BrestLitovsk that allowed the Baltic States to officially separate from the empire and gave them
certain freedoms although they frequently interfered with the newly established indigenous
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Baltic governments.94 He submitted a statement of peace terms regarding Russia that he
wanted to present at the Peace Conference that included the following two conclusions:
1. Exterior unconditional abrogation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and all other
agreements concluded by the German Government after Nov. 7 1917, either with
the authorities acting in the name of Russia [the Bolsheviks] or with whatever
National or Political groups claiming to represent authority over any territory of the
former Russian Empire.
2. Evacuation of German troops from the territory of the former Russain Empire…95
It was no coincidence that anti-Bolshevik Russian organizations in the U.S. were also
“bombarding the State Department and White House with petitions and appeals favoring
adherence to the principle of a ‘one and indivisible Russia’ and portraying Baltic leaders of
independence as German puppets.”96 Bakhmetev knew that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had to
be voided in order to keep the Baltic States a part of the Empire as the treaty legally separated
it. German authorities did in fact allow local governments to organize and even allowed the
Taryba, which set up strong networks of sovereignty support and independent institutions, to
form.97 Characterizing the Baltic nationalists as German puppets, their claims to selfdetermination would seem unauthentic and not gain any traction in the United States. If
Bakhmetev could get Wilson and the State Department to see the Baltic leaders as marionettes
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of the German Kaiser, it would make U.S. support for their independence very unlikely.
Recognition pleas and recommendations in the Baltic Commission were blocked, “by the firm
commitment of Italy and particularly the United States to the territorial integrity of Russia.”98
Bakhmetev’s influence was affirmed when the Allies called for the renunciation of the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk and the removal of German soldiers from former Russian lands under the
Armistice ending World War I.
Chapter 4: The Russian Civil War
Expansion of the Civil War into the Baltics after the Versailles Peace Treaty created
havoc for the young indigenous governments that were somewhat protected by the presence
of German troops. In this manner, more and more militant factions began fighting in the region
and word got back to the U.S. State Department that the situation was serious. Diplomatic
views of different ambassadors from both Russia and the U.S. stopped the State Department
from answering Baltic recognition and assistance requests. U.S. involvement in Russia’s Civil
War in the Baltics was minimal and mostly consisted of humanitarian aid. Although seen as a
precursor for recognition, organizations such as the American Relief Administration were rather
used as a substitute.99 Such relief efforts still continued Baltic hopes for U.S. recognition of
their independence. Ultimately, peace treaties were signed by each Baltic government with the
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Soviet Russians as local fighting dwindled from external intervention in Russia proper (mainly
from Great Britain) and Baltic nationalists forces pushed out White Russian troops.100
The difficulty in determining the true placement of power from so many competing
political factions during the Civil War can be exemplified by recognition pleas from nationalists
becoming more desperate. Pleas, declarations, petitions, and appeals submitted to the U.S.
government by the newly enfranchised Baltic leaders before Fall of 1918, only asked for moral
support for their independence.101 Article XII of the Armistice Convention directed all German
troops in former Russian territory to retreat, “as soon as the Allies shall think the moment
suitable having regard to the internal situation of these territories.”102 Reports had made it
clear that the internal situation of these territories was a mess.103 Without having consent from
the Allies, defeated and hungry German troops began to retreat, violating Article XII of the
Armistice, while the Russian Civil War was at a peak in the Baltic States. The newly formed
provisional government of Lithuania appealed to the Allies on November 11, 1918 via radio,
“for aid against Bolshevik danger as Red Army troops began to move into the vacuum left by
withdrawing Germans.”104 The increase of political instability in the Baltic States that resulted
from the end of WWI is reflected in the changing aid requests to the United States.
With a German communist revolution taking place in Berlin, the Red Army was
instructed to convert the Baltic Sea to a “Soviet Sea” that could influence revolutions in
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Scandinavia and Germany alike.105 During December of 1918, the Council of People’s
Commissars and the Central Executive committee of the Soviets of Worker, Soldier, and
Peasant Deputies even recognized the Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.106
Under Soviet rule, recognition by the U.S. was impossible and although the true extent of Soviet
power in the area is doubtful at the very least due to reports of intensive yet unsuccessful
Bolshevik campaigns, the soviet presence created more desperate conditions for Baltic
nationalists.107 Maintaining hope, the American Lithuanian National Council submitted a long
telegram to the State Department now requesting not only independence, but also for
American troops to occupy Lithuania.108 Although no reply was given, there was recognition of
receipt. There were repeated requests for recognition of the newly organized State Council of
Lithuania as the provisional government of an independent Lithuanian state but there was no
reply.109 The continuous silence in Washington suggests uncertainty, and constantly changing
hands of power in the area support that uncertainty.
The event that came to be known as Estonia’s War of Independence from late
November, 1918 to March, 1919, showcases the confusing multitude of agents involved in
various armed conflicts of the time period. Most of these groups were from areas surrounding
the Baltics and expanded local instability due to their fighting. This particular battle consisted
of the following groups: Estonian and Latvian nationalists, backed by most of the local
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population and by the Entente, the British Navy, British and French advisers, Finnish volunteers,
White Russian armies under several commanders, Polish forces, the Landeswehr force, an “Iron
Division” of German mercenaries, Estonian and Latvian Bolsheviks, the Red Army, and the
Latvian Rifles.110 The Baltic Germans were trying to retain their influence and privileges dating
back to the Teutonic Knights, the Bolsheviks and their sympathizers wanted to set up a Soviet
state, and the nationalists and their sympathizers were trying to retain their claim to
independent statehood.
It was difficult for the United States government to fully trust and understand the
confusing political situation in the Baltics, Latvia in particular. The Latvians faced a peculiar
situation because Latvia had more notable pro-Bolshevik tendencies. The U.S. government was
in no way likely to recognize and form diplomatic relations with a small soviet state if it was not
going to even recognize the more powerful Bolshevik Russian government. The Red Army’s
commander in chief was a Latvian, and ethnic Latvians made up a majority of the cheka.111 In
Soviet military history, only one Baltic military group would have prominent mention, the
Latvian Riflemen. Their fame for consolidating Lenin’s power and being a significant section of
the Red Army is well known. Regiments of the Riflemen had once formed the Kremlin Guard,
and were critical to keeping Lenin in power at the beginning of 1918.112
However, the U.S. General Staff’s Intelligence Division published a guidebook on Latvia
in 1919 that said Latvians have a nationalist movement and are more pro-Allies, rather than
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pro-Bolshevik.113 Although the guidebook shows that the U.S. government saw Latvia’s struggle
as a nationalist one, its Bolshevist leanings and support of the Iskolaat government under
Štucka, is difficult to ignore. Reports that the Latvian capital of Riga is under the control of
Bolsheviks because of uprisings comprised of “some Lettish” that were using British supplied
arms further blurred the true stance of Latvian sentiment.114 Bolshevik tendencies of each of
the Baltic States could be questioned by association and fed into the concept of a united Russia.
The set-up of soviet regimes along the Baltic coast during the Russian Civil War naturally made
the Western powers hesitate even more when considering the recognition of Baltic
independence. The Allies, the United States in particular, did not want another Bolshevik
government and had legitimate reason to question whether the Baltics, especially Latvia, would
ultimately become socialist states.
Frequent skirmishes and changing hands of power that included many actors made it
difficult for distant states to know exactly which agents were holding a solid majority of power
in the area. Different alliances were made. For example, Estonian nationalists sided with some
White Russians to drive back the Red Army in May of 1919. Afterwards, General Nikolai
Yudenich assumed command of Russian forces and the Estonian troops moved south to help
the Latvian nationalists fight the Baltic German and White Russian allied forces under Colonel
Bermondt-Avalov in Riga.115 By November, as Yudenich’s army was retreating from Petrograd
to Estonia, his forces were disarmed and disbanded by the nationalists because he refused to
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recognize the concept of Baltic independence.116 Even though the nationalist forces won and
the Red Army was forced to retreat further and further away from Tallinn, the sheer number of
powerful actors with different interests, made a stable consolidation of power in the hands of
the nationalists alone unlikely.
During the height of the Russian Civil War in the Baltics, cries for assistance and the
safeguarding of the nationalist governments that came from recognition were ignored. The
need for military assistance to the Baltic nationalists that was answered by the British and
French missions was ignored by the Americans.117 On December 20th, 1918, President Janis
čakste of the Latvian State Council requested naval protection, arms, and munitions because of
the, “urgent need to combat Bolsheviks who were advancing like a tide, taking hostages,
pillaging, and levying contributions, while the Germans were purposely handing Latvia over to
the Bolsheviks.”118 One would assume that U.S. involvement in the Russian Civil War,
admittedly it was minimal, would extend to the Baltic nationalists as well, but that was not the
case because nationalist aspirations would contradict the U.S. vision of a strong Russia.119
When asked for assistance in fighting Bolshevik forces, Lansing instructed American officials to
not give any assurances implied by advising Latvian authorities to not conclude an armistice
with Bolshevik Russia.120 The U.S.’s decision to not intervene actually helped the Baltic
nationalists by forcing them into peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Continued fighting
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may have led to White Russian forces gaining traction in the Civil War and eliminating any
chances of Russian support for Baltic self-determination.
Ambassador Bakhmetev understood the significance behind U.S. recognition and made
it known. According to Albert Tarulis, the Russian Ambassador reminded the U.S. that the
“independence of small states could only be maintained artificially, through the political and
economic support of an outside power ‘actuated by a purpose of jeopardizing the economic
freedom of Russia and interfering with the liberty of her commercial intercourse.’”121
Bakhmetev made the economic necessity of the Baltic States for Russia an argument that was
sure to win over America’s sympathy. The U.S. Division of Russian Affairs shared this view and
deemed the economic resources of the Baltic States as insufficient to maintain “prosperous
independence.”122 Since the U.S. believed Russia would shed Bolshevism and return to
normalcy anyway, it could not feasibly “interfere with the liberty of her commercial
intercourse.” Baltic ports were described as an integral part of it.
The economic vitality the Baltic States brought to the Russian Empire was exaggerated.
The purpose behind such an exaggeration is twofold; if the U.S. saw the economic necessity
ownership of the Baltic ports brought to the country, support of its dismemberment would
decline and if the Baltic States were to be recognized as independent, they would need to
sustain economic independence. Great effort was put into placing the Baltic States and Russian
Empire as mutually dependent.123 The Russian Political Conference prepared pamphlets that
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were distributed to the Allied diplomats, newspaper officials, and the public.124 These
pamphlets claimed the Baltic ports handled 20% of Russia’s foreign trade.125 Such a large
portion of trade would have significant economic consequences for any country, thus making it
difficult for anyone to support such a devastating economic blow. With such a claim, foreign
ministries would have to consider whether the nationalistic aspirations of a small population on
Russia’s western borders is justification for possibly wrecking Russia’s economic health. To
further dramatize the economic consequences of Baltic recognition, Vassily A. Maklakov,
Russia’s ambassador in Paris, claimed that the “absolute independence of Baltic states would
mean Russia’s ruin economically and strategically.”126 Neither the U.S. nor the other Allied
powers had reason to “ruin” Russia. Since the economic vitality of Russia supposedly depended
on the Baltic ports, recognition of the independent Baltic States would mean support of
Russia’s decline.
Realistically, Russia’s economy did not depend on its control of the Baltic ports. Before
the war, the Baltic ports only handled 1/5th of the tonnage from Russia’s foreign trade, and only
1/6th of its value; significantly less than the original claim127 However, Russia held claim to the
importance of those ports and their right to maintain them. A letter from the Russian Political
Conference explained that they would never renounce their claim to the area, because the
geographical position of the Baltic States attached them to Russia, which had invested a lot of
money “toward the development of ports which are indispensable to her trade.”128
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Desperately seeking independence, the Baltic States incorporated free trade provisions in their
peace treaties with Russia so as to make the economic dependence argument invalid.129 The
open port assurances made by the Baltic States were disregarded in Washington.130 The policy
of non-recognition continued, justified by the argument that the Baltic Provinces were of
economic vitality for Russia and the Baltic States would be unable to maintain economic
independence.
Concerning the Baltics, the Russian Civil War was over in 1920 as each nationalist
government signed peace treaties with the Bolsheviks. Tired of fighting and wishing to
maintain their independence, secret talks began with Foreign Commissioner Chicherin after
Lloyd George persuaded his cabinet to stop supplying White Russians with arms via the Baltic
States.131 Soviet Russia recognized Estonia’s independence and signed a Peace Treaty at Tartu
that would keep Red Army and White Russian soldiers out of the country February 2, 1920.132
Both Latvia and Lithuania followed suit as they sought negotiations with Chicherin and signed
peace treaties ending the Civil War in the Baltics on August 1st and July 12, 1920,
respectively.133 Solidifying the separation of Soviet Russia and Baltic States, Article 1 of the
Russo-Lithuanian Peace Treaty states:
In accordance with the declaration made by the Russian Federative Socialist Soviet
Republic of the right belonging to all nations of free self-determination…Russia
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unconditionally recognized the sovereignty and independence of the State of
Lithuania…relinquishes for all time all the sovereign rights which Russia had…134
The Treaty of Tartu and Treaty of Riga offered the same relinquishment of power to the
indigenous governments. This formal separation from Russia did not involve a German
protectorate and resulted in stable governments. Baltic leaders would no longer have to worry
about the imminent threat of Russian invasion and could focus their energies on international
recognition since White Russians and the U.S. still viewed the states as temporary.
Even towards the end of the Russian Civil War, Bakhmetev maintained strongly against
the separation of the Baltic States from the Russian Empire. His views of the Baltic States
mimics U.S. policy and maintain that the U.S. not recognize them for it would create a
permanently bad relationship with Russia. He writes,
The only point to which Russian opinion strongly objects is the recognition of the [Baltic]
States in a form which would legalize their separation from Russia and grant them an
international status of complete sovereignty and independence. Such a course,
qualified as ‘dismemberment of Russia,’ has called for most emphatic protests from
Russian bodies of all shades of political thought.135
This fear of the “dismemberment of Russia” has been echoed in the State Department
continuously in reference to any suggestions of recognizing the Baltic States. He refers to
Russia’s political situation as a “temporary disability” and says that recognition of the Baltic
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States would be considered taking advantage of that temporary disability. He continues to call
the independent condition of the Baltic States one of the most temporary nature and writes
“even now the Baltic States might be swept away if circumstances would warrant the
expedience of an aggression by the Moscow Soviet.”136 Mimicking the understanding of the
United States, Bakhmetev says the independence of the Baltic States, “would last only while
Russia remained inarticulate.”137
U.S. Ambassador John W. Davis held fast to the notion of an indivisible Russia.
Ambassador Davis’ reaction to many notices from the Latvian nationalists played a role in
watering down any support Washington may have had in recognizing the Baltic States. From
his post in London, he received passionate requests from the Latvian Foreign Minister, Zigfrids
Meierovics, to inform Wilson that the Latvian government was begging him to, “save in the
name of humanity, an entire country from murder and annihilation by organized foreign
bands.”138 Davis’ minimum response was a blowback to Baltic nationalists. Henri Simson,
Latvia’s representative in London, had contact with Davis during this time of crisis. Simson
informed Davis that the German troops were evading Article XII of the Armistice Convention
and evacuating Latvia without first receiving orders from the Allied powers. Davis was also told
that the Germans were delivering arms, munitions, and fortified posts to the Bolsheviks, and
were, “systematically devastating the country and are pillaging and murdering in concert with
the Russian troops who are coming in to take their place.”139 Although he was made aware of
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the urgency the matter required, he did not dispatch the note for another ten days when
almost all of Latvia was under Bolshevik control and also used regular mail for delivery.140
Davis’ decision to sit on the notice does not have an explanation but it was a clear indication of
his views. He did not see the matter as something urgent or worthwhile for the U.S. to react to.
If Davis had seen the case for Baltic independence as one worthy of his support, he would not
have waited ten days to forward an enclosed translation of Simson’s notice. Also, by choosing
to send the letter via regular mail, Davis showed his lack of urgency. In fact, the Ambassador’s
letter was not received by the State Department until January 25, 1919, approximately 35 days
after Simson’s initial notice.141 His personal message to the Acting Secretary of State was very
short and contained more clues into his opinion of the Baltic situation. He wrote that Simson’s
letter contained, “a protest against the alleged violation by Germany of Article XII of the
Armistice.”142 Without bluntly stating his opinion, Davis makes it known that he does not
believe the “alleged” violations are taking place. Ambassadors are a source of information for
foreign policy and their portrayal of events has a direct and significant impact on U.S. foreign
policy. Without U.S. ambassadors that were aligned with the cause of the Baltic nationalists, it
was highly unlikely that the State Department would change its policy of non-recognition.
A change in diplomatic personality also positively changed the outlook on the Baltic
States. To have a better understanding of the happenings in the Baltic, Evan E. Young was
assigned to the post of Commissioner of the United States for the Baltic Provinces of Russia in

140

Tarulis, American-Baltic Relations, 116.
No. 36 from the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State, December 30, 1918, FRUS,
1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. II, 480-481.
142
Ibid.
141

48

1919.143 In contrast to Ambassador Davis, Commissioner Young promptly reported changes in
the region. Responding to a successful Bolshevik attack on Poland August 10, 1920 Young
reported that the situation in the Baltic area was critical and warned that armed conflict will
break out between Estonia and Soviet Russia because Estonia would reject its demand for a
union.144 Unlike Ambassador Davis, he promptly warned the State Department of a hostile
situation and received a reply from Secretary Colby the following day. Young’s concern was
matched by Major Edward W. Ryan, the American Red Cross Commissioner for the Baltic States
and Western Russia.145 In response to their concern, on August 11th, the USS Pittsburgh was
sent to Tallinn and plans were made to evacuate the 250 Americans involved in relief efforts in
the Baltic States.146 Regardless of the situation, the presence of the visiting admirals and
commanders from the U.S. likely sparked hope along with inquiry on the part of the nationalist
Baltic governments. Latvian President K. Ulmanis, like other Baltic leaders, wondered why U.S.
ships were there because of their consistent refusal to recognize Baltic independence.147
However, the important part is that U.S. ships were actually sent to the region, even though it
was not to help fight the Russians (be they Bolsheviks or Imperialists), but rather because
Young was actually concerned about the severity of the situation and reported it to his
superiors. His reports on desperate conditions in Latvia and Estonia caused the State Depart to
“appraise the situation in the Baltic with caution…the Department felt that conditions in Latvia
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were ‘more disturbed than usual.’”148 The reappraisal of the Baltic situation definitely did not
favor recognition because it showed instability, but it served as a reminder that the Baltic
region no longer considered itself and integral part of Russia.
In a letter from President Wilson to the President of the assembly of the League of
Nations, Paul Hymans, Wilson stated a reason against recognition; he was concerned about the
instability on Russia’s borders created by mutual mistrust and fear of war.149 The Soviets
refused to demobilize because they were afraid of new attacks, while nationalist groups on
Russia’s border are afraid to disarm because they did not trust the Bolsheviks.150 Wilson’s
explanation of his concern gave hope to some Baltic nationalists. The passage in question is
written as follows:
It is obvious to all that these small struggling border states will not attack Great Russia
unless encouraged by promise of support from the stronger powers…an attempt at
pacification must be a public and solemn engagement among the Great Powers not to
take advantage of Russia’s stricken condition and not to violate the territorial integrity
of Russia nor undertake themselves any further invasions of Russia, not to tolerate such
invasions by others. . . . The responsibility for any new war which might break out on the
Russian border would then be clearly placed.151
Jonas Vileišis, the self-titled “Representative of Lithuania in America” (which is how he signed
all of his communications with the State Department), saw the opportunity to change America’s
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attitude. Although the passage states that the U.S. does not want to “violate the territorial
integrity of Russia,” ideals of pacification are mentioned, and if he could convince the State
Department that Lithuania’s actions were rooted solely in self-defense and they had no further
intention of engaging in conflict with Russia, perhaps America’s foreign policy would change.
Unsuccessfully, Vileišis tried just that. On January 27th, he assured the State Department that
the Lithuanian government wanted to return to peaceful existence and their military efforts
were only in self-defense against Bolshevik aggression.152 The new pleas for recognition tried
to address Wilson’s concerns by explaining the regions violence employing self-defense and
claiming a wish for peaceful relations with Russia. Of course, that did not change the fact that
American policy was still under the influence of the Russian Ambassador Bakhmetev and in the
hands of officials that were devoted to the concept of a Great Russia.
Chapter 5: Post Civil War Hurdles for U.S. Recognition
External intervention from the U.S. primarily came in the form of political influence
through self-determination rhetoric, siding with White Russians during the Civil War, and
voiding the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that caused internal instability. The limited extent of U.S.
intervention in the Baltics kept pleas for recognition going. The lack of independence
recognition from the international community that allowed for the internal instability of the
Baltics to get so out of control ended in relatively stable Baltic Republics run by indigenous local
governments. The de jure recognition offered by the Supreme Allied Council, excluding the U.S.,
and American political changes in administration and diplomatic personality, allowed domestic
pushes for recognition to prevail.
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One must first understand why the United States was looking into the Baltic situation in
order to comprehend how U.S. foreign policy changed with the onset of 1920. In his 1919
“Report of the Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania” commissioned by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Robert Hale notes the importance of the Baltic States in the U.S.:
The key to the Russian problem is in the Baltic States, and on the proper solution of the
Russian problem depends the peace of the world. We can not shirk these problems and
do our duty as the world power which, whether we like it or not, we are… We can not
ignore them… For the world’s sake and our own selfish sake, we can not afford to have
Bolshevism coming through to the west; we can not afford to have an ambitious and
unscrupulous Prussia piercing through to the east…The problem is as monumental as it
is urgent.153
Following Hale’s report, serious changes in U.S. foreign policy were primarily limited to Western
Europe. However, Hale represents the interest of small groups of government officials that felt
it was a moral right for the U.S. government to address the Russian problem in terms of the
Baltic States. The fear of Bolshevik expansion accompanied the moral obligation the majority of
Baltic independence supporters argued was the reason that the U.S. must extend recognition.
Yet the initial de jure recognition attempts by such groups or individuals did not work.
Attempts at de facto recognition were likewise unsuccessful. The State Department and
American officials abroad were careful to make sure that their correspondence with
secessionist states was minimal and would not yield de facto recognition. Feeling
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unrepresented in the U.S., Baltic governments unsuccessfully tried to appoint Consuls in
Washington.154 Indirect attempts at gaining international recognition of their sovereignty
through de facto diplomatic relations were used by all Baltic governments after initial formal
recognition attempts fell through but they had no official relations with the State
Department.155 For example, the State Department did acknowledge the correspondence
between the U.S. minister in Bern, Pleasant Stovall, and the Lithuanian National Council in
Lausanne but did not consider those contacts as the formation of de facto relations.156 Acting
carefully to not establish de facto relations, Lansing “took under serious scrutiny…Stovall’s
request for transmission of Lithuanian communications from Lausanne to the American
Lithuanian National Council in Washington.”157
Baltic representatives were turned away from the United States, so as to not establish
de facto relations. As a first step toward attempted de facto recognition, the American
Lithuanian National Council informed the State Department that Dr. John Szlupas has been
“detailed to act as the envoy to the U.S.”158 Although there was no reply from the Americans
and Dr. Szlupas was not accepted into the ranks of foreign diplomats.159 If the U.S. had
accepted him as an envoy, diplomatic de facto relations could have been established;
contradicting U.S.-Baltic policy. A similar situation occurred with an Estonian representative.
Ferdinand Kull was selected as the Estonian official to go to Washington to discuss matters of
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mutual interest, and try to establish relations. However, Minister Ira N. Morris cabled the State
Department from Stockholm that Kull was pro-German, causing the acting Secretary of State,
Richard L. Polk, to give instructions to deny Kull’s visa application.160 The rejection of Estonia’s
attempt at de facto relations also showed the difficulty the U.S. government had in determining
the intentions of Baltic officials. Morris’ accusation of Kull’s pro-German leanings cast doubt on
his sincerity and good faith, and was another legitimate excuse to reject recognition.
The 1920 election brought along with it a change of administration, diplomatic staff, and
a chance for foreign policy revision in favor of Baltic independence. Domestic elections
frequently influence that nation’s foreign relations, so the Baltic nationalists began to intervene
in U.S. domestic elections for their own gain. The significance of the 1920 election for
supporters of Baltic independence is evidenced by domestic pressure placed upon the new
President for recognition as unofficial Baltic representatives were setting up offices in
Washington. Before Harding was even inaugurated, he started to receive recognition petitions
from American Lithuanians.161
A change in administration changed the officials that were in charge of formulating and
carrying out U.S. foreign policy. Warren G. Harding’s new Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes,
believed that, “independence and equality of states was the postulate of international
relations.”162 This statement can either be taken cynically by comparing Hughes’ ideals to
Wilson’s championing of self-determination that did not amount to much of anything for the
Baltic States, or as an opportunity to change foreign policy. Consul Albrecht, on the eve of
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Harding’s inauguration, tried to push his support of the Baltics onto the newcomers in the State
Department by reminding them that, “the United States remains the outstanding great power
which has withheld not only de jure but de facto recognition… and failure to recognize will only
cause ill-feeling and difficulty in trade relations.”163 He did not get a response, but this was the
first attempt by an American diplomatic official to get Washington to change its policy of nonrecognition.
Colby and Hughes had more relaxed policies toward Baltic representatives on missions
of a diplomatic nature than Lansing. For example, under Colby and Hughes, Kalninš and Vileišis
were able to stay in DC as the unofficial consular agent of Latvia, and Lithuania’s unofficial
representative, respectively.164 With Colby’s permission, Edward Wirgo was also appointed as
Estonia’s unofficial representative of in the United States.165 Those representatives were
informal, but they were not sent away- making another stride toward recognition.
The appointment of Consular representatives to the Baltic region was a huge stride
toward recognition. It gave the State Department a much closer look at the region and much
more reliable information. Now, Washington could get reports that it trusted from its officials
and know which political factions were in charge and whether or not they were stable enough
for the U.S. to extend recognition. Initially, there were only Consular representatives in Estonia
and Latvia, and the battle for a Lithuanian Consular was also fought by Young.166 In a memo to
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the State Department, he listed two reasons for the importance of Consular representation in
Lithuania; there were an increasing number of countries that had recognized an independent
Lithuania and were establishing diplomatic relations, and the British were trying to gain an
economic monopoly in the area.167
Young reminded Hughes that England already had an appointed Commissioner for
Lithuania while the U.S. still had yet to recognize the country and did not have a Consul in
Kaunas.168 Growth of business transactions after 1920 between the U.S. and the Baltic States
required the appropriate diplomatic institutions to handle the growing volume of trade. The
large presence of American Lithuanians with economic ties to the newly independent state
made a strong argument for a Consul in Kaunas to facilitate trade and handle business.169
Consequently, Clement S. Edwards was sent to Kaunas July 13, 1921 but received the additional
instructions to remember that, “the question of the recognition of an independent Lithuanian
Government by the United States was not involved.”170 Although the Consular appointment
specified non-recognition, its presence was a visual reminder of slowly growing ties with the
Americans. In this manner, the external presence showcased a stabilizing internal situation.
The U.S. would not have set up a Consul if the region was still in a chaotic state that could pose
a threat to its staff.
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External recognition, emphasized by Young’s support of independent Baltic States,
helped the recognition process along. Young was supportive of the Baltic nationalists and used
his post and influence to continuously press for recognition. He sent reports to Washington
whenever another state recognized the Baltic States.171 With some reservation for Lithuania
due to its conflict with Poland, the principal Allied powers, except the U.S., recognized the Baltic
States on January 1921.172 The Baltic States were no longer without any powerful friends, even
though they still lacked America’s recognition. Continuing his pro-recognition tendency, Young
followed up the Allied powers extension of recognition with the following reminder to his
government:
If I may venture a suggestion as to what form our policy should take, if any change in our
policy is or may be contemplated, it would be that we extend without further delay de
jure recognition to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, coupled with a frank statement that we
leave to the future the determination of the relationship which shall exist between the
present so-called Baltic States and a new, orderly, and stable Russia.173
The latter portion of Young’s message reflected his view that any new Russia would not include
the Baltic coast. In this manner, Young differed from his predecessors. By stating that the
future relationship between the Baltics and Russia should be left to them, Young moves away
from the idea that a strong Russia must, or should, include the Baltics.
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Some private firms along with newspapers began to lobby the State Department for
recognition less than two weeks before the Supreme Council of Allies extended it to Estonia and
Latvia, and decided to hold off recognizing Lithuania temporarily until it solved the conflict with
Poland over Vilnius. Just before the decision of the Allied powers to recognize the Baltic States,
a Memorandum on Behalf of Lithuanian Independence was received by the Acting Secretary of
State from the PR firm of McAdoo, Cotton &Franklin on January 15th, 1921.174 The memo listed
the following arguments for recognition:
1. The U.S. government is traditionally sympathetic to national aspirations.
2. Hope for restoration of a free Russia should not stop the national aspirations of
independent non-Russian peoples.
3. Status quo would put non-Russian border peoples under unnecessary Russian
misfortunes.
4. Lithuanians are not Russians in every way; by race, language, religion, etc.
5. The Lithuanian government has been recognized by Great Britain, France, Finland,
Latvia, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Soviet Russia, and Italy while the U.S. unfairly
recognized some former Russian territories, (i.e. Poland, Finland, and Armenia).
6. Lithuania is throwing off Soviet rule, and should be encouraged and supported.
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7. Recognition and admittance to the League of Nations would force Poland to withdraw
its troops from Lithuania and deprive Soviet Russia of claim that Lithuania allows hostile
troops on its territory, thus averting the danger of a Russian invasion.175
McAdoo’s calls for recognition made it into the New York Times and spread those same ideas.
The article states, “McAdoo says that the effect of refusal to recognize Lithuania is not to help
the Russian people but to force the Lithuanians back into Russia under Soviet rule.”176 Claiming
that the current policy would strengthen Soviet rule would likely gain Baltic recognition support
from Americans that were previously indifferent or favored a democratic Russia with its old
borders. Although newspaper articles do not change foreign policy, they publicize actions of
U.S. government officials that are subject to democratic elections.
Congressman Chandler from New York was a major supporter of Baltic independence
and lobbied the U.S. government for support and full recognition from within. May 16, 1921
the New York Representative argued that a nation requires four essential concurring elements
to assert independence and claim the precious right of self-determination: physical basis of
geography, territory, and population, well-defined distinctions in blood, language, and religion
from the larger state, educational basis of citizenship, and governmental oppression by a larger
nation over a small one.177 He argued in detail that each of the Baltic States has each of those
elements and therefore a “sacred and solemn duty rests upon the United State to recognize at
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once the independence de jure of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.”178 Further support came from
Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, as he joined the petitioners. Hoover spent time in
Eastern Europe during his war-time relief experiences and supported recognition due to his
concern for the suffering people and the opportunity present for expanding trade relations.179
Memorial Day in 1921 saw the peak of a large campaign for recognition. On that day,
Harding received 135 volumes of bounded signed petitions from a delegation of American
Lithuanians and Latvians introduced by Representative Chandler.180 One million signatures on a
petition for recognition included Senators, Representatives, Governors, Professors, clergymen,
mayors, and ordinary American citizens.181 Such massive petitions are difficult to ignore. As
the issue of Baltic recognition became more and more prevalent with stabilizing conditions in
Eastern Europe, a change in policy once again seemed feasible. Internal memorandums for and
against recognition once again circulated in the State Department revamping the debate.182
On September 22, 1921, the League of Nations voted the Baltic republics into full
membership, affirming their nation-state status. The Baltic republics were still looking for U.S.
recognition. Young summarized the Latvian (and by extension Estonian and Lithuanian)
attitude toward the United States as:
Hostility toward American policy; the keenest regret and disappointment at United
States failure to extend de jure recognition; friendliness toward American citizens, due
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to some extent to the activities of American relief organizations: the Red Cross, A.R.A.,
YMCA, YWCA, Joint Distribution Committee, and HIAS.183
The question of Baltic recognition remained relatively quiet afterwards. The only following
progressive move on behalf of the U.S. in 1921 was the appointment of a Consul in Kaunas
under Clements J. Edwards.
Renewed debate among the State Department for Baltic independence recognition also
brought with it a White Russian perspective. July 1, 1921, Ambassador Bakhmetev submitted
an Aide Memoire that said the problem of “the so-called Baltic States” was that they were
temporary and did not have the deep-rooted historical traditions that would allow permanent
severance from Russia.184 He claimed, “It would be a flagrant violation of the principle of
political morality if advantage would be taken of the temporary disability of Russia for
settlements which would prejudice Russia’s position as a political and economic entity.”185 This
reminder of America’s duty to uphold Russia’s greatness and not recognize the Baltic States as
independent entities took hold because recognition was once again delayed for another year.
1922 brought a change in U.S.-Baltic relations; by the end of Summer official relations
were established. In the beginning of the year, Washington was still clinging to its old policy
and reiterated those views in the following statement:
The United States has not recognized the so-called Governments of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. An American Commissioner and American consular officers are, nevertheless,
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stationed within the territory which they control, and informal relations of a friendly
character are maintained. There are informal Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian
representatives in the United States.186
Although Washington claimed to maintain its earlier policy, the admission of having
representatives, even of informal nature, differed significantly from previous statements.
The removal of a strong Russian influence in the State Department paved the road to
recognition. Ambassador Bakhmetev resigned in April 28, 1922 from his influential post since
his reception in Washington in July, 1917.187 Albert Tarulis sums up the Ambassador’s influence
by stating, “Finally, a major obstacle toward recognition was eliminated with Bakhmetev’s
resignation…Many a decision was first checked with him. Many a communication carried ideas
he had suggested. Many a measure failed of adoption because he had disapproved.”188
Following his resignation, supporters of Baltic independence had new opportunities to sway
opinion in the State Department to their favor.
After Bakhmetev’s resignation, the State Department tried to gain the most current
information of the internal situation in the Baltics, suggesting an upcoming new policy. Hughes
took initiative by requesting the Division of Russian Affairs to prepare a memorandum listing all
the pros and cons of recognition.189 The new Secretary of State no longer questioned
recognition of Latvia and Estonia, but still wanted Young’s opinion as to whether the Vilna
Plebiscite effectively ending the Polish-Lithuanian controversy justified simultaneous
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recognition of Lithuania.190 Young replied that, “there is no longer any probability of armed
conflict between Poland and Lithuania.”191 Along with opportunity for Baltic independence
recognition, Young also received additional staff in preparation for such recognition. The State
Department assigned Consul Harold B. Quarton, Vice Consul Earl I. Packer, and additional
personnel to Riga along with Young to make his office “the Department’s principal source of
information relating to conditions and the progress of events in Soviet Russia”192 By assigning
additional Americans to the region, the Baltics were becoming the West’s window to the East,
and especially the happenings in Soviet Russia.
The decision of the principal Allied powers to recognize the third Baltic State solidified
the international community’s view, with the exception of the U.S., that the internal Baltic
situation was stable. Settlement of the Vilnius question allowed for de jure recognition of
Lithuania to be extended by the principal Allied powers.193 The Associated Press wrote about
the June 30, Conference of Ambassadors’ decision:
No representative of the United States participated in this decision nor in the discussion
which preceded the action of the Council. Opinion was withheld on the part of the
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United States and the right reserved for the American Government to take whatever
attitude it cared to later.194
Undoubtedly, the large number of Baltic Americans and other supporters of independence
recognition were unhappy with such news. Independent republics of Estonia and Latvia had
already been recognized now that Lithuania agreed to stop fighting Poland for Vilnius and also
gained recognition, U.S. policy seemed outdated and out of touch with the rest of the Western
world. Publicity of the continuing non-recognition policy reenergized domestic pressure.
Commissioner Young confirmed that U.S. policy seemed outdated and should be
reconsidered. He submitted another request for the U.S. to extend recognition to the Baltic
States April 6, 1922. He affirmed:
A careful and searching survey of conditions today unquestionably brings one to the
conclusion that, given a continuation of conditions as they are at present, these States
will encounter comparative little difficulty in maintaining themselves as political
entities… each one of these so-called States has made very considerable and very
substantial progress in the primary and essential work of the successful administration
of their several territories…bear in mind the fact that in each one of these countries the
nationals of the government in power make up the great majority of the
population…these governments exercise their power by and with the consent of their
respective peoples. 195
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His appraisal of the Baltic situation affirms the maintenance of its newfound stability. By 1922,
the nationalists were in full control and Young describes their administration as “successful.”
Young affirmed that all three States were ready for recognition since they were already
functioning under the principles of self-determination.196 After a turbulent period, their
governments were representative of their populations and they were ruling with consent, all
principles U.S. rhetoric supported.
Following the Council’s recognition of Lithuania, a petition of 29 prominent American
educators asked for recognition of all three Baltic States. Princeton University Professor Harold
H. Bender led the petition.197 It that implored Hughes “in behalf of national justice,
international peace and stability, and the growth of democratic ideals in the world that the
Government of the United States extend formal recognition to the republics of Lithuania,
Latvia, and Esthonia.”198 In his quest to gain support of other professors, Bender sent letters to
his peers at other universities pointing out America’s outdated foreign policy. Noting recent
stabilizing events and the four years of maintained independence of those states, Bender claims
the Baltic States “represent democracy as we understand it.”199 He writes that there is no real
objection from the government and at the time, there was none, other than a continued policy
from Lansing’s term. Signed by esteemed American educators such as the President Emeritus
of Harvard, Presidents of Princeton, Lafayette, and Mount Holyoke, the petition was brought to
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Hughes’ personal attention.200 The petition seemed to work because within one month of its
receipt, U.S. policy changed.
The last domestic push for recognition made Hughes address President Harding in favor
of revising U.S. policy. On July 24, 1922, Hughes wrote a letter to Harding stating his belief that
the time had come to grant recognition to “the so-called Baltic States.”201 He noted that the
economic and political conditions under the Baltic governments have been stable within their
jurisdictions, informal relations have been established between them and the U.S. for over two
years, and have been recognized by all other important governments.202 Regarding Russia,
Hughes wrote of the motive for a change in policy:
Recognition by the United States has been delayed by considerations connected with
the whole Russian problem…it was felt that the interest of the United States required
for the future a strong and united as well as democratic Russia…we can, I believe, deal
with the Baltic question on its merits, extend recognition to the Baltic Governments and
have this action accord with our general Russian policy.203
Hughes’ letter, like the one he received from Professor Bender five days earlier, summarizes the
difficulty in gaining recognition because it was seen as an integral part of Russia but asserts that
it should change.204 The belief in the right of the Baltic situation to be handled on its own
mimics prior arguments based on self-determination. Hughes’ description of Russia’s political
situation as the “Russian problem” and the political situation in the Baltics as the “Baltic
200
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question” separates the two areas. The economic situation was reexamined and the debt of
the Baltic governments was deemed to be in no different position to the U.S. as that of other
Allied governments; thus favoring recognition as was noted on the State Department file.205 As
for Harding, he was “quite agreeable to recognition and most cordially endorsed the form of
announcement” suggested by Hughes.206
Harding’s rapid approval of Hughes’ recommendation for extending recognition finalized
the decision. Young was instructed on July 25th to inform the Foreign Offices of each Baltic
State that the U.S. would extend de jure recognition to all three of them on July 28th.207 Full
recognition from the U.S. was granted July 28, 1922 with the following message:
…the Government of the United States takes cognizance of the actual existence of these
Governments during a considerable period of time and of the successful maintenance
within their borders of political and economic stability. The United States has
consistently maintained that the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may not be
made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not
deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time of the Governments of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania which have been set up and maintained by an indigenous
population.208
With this statement, Baltic and Russian policy officially became two separate entities.
Recognition was based on the maintenance of political stability and the principle of self205
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determination as shown by the description of Baltic governments as set up by “an indigenous
population.” The State Department’s Diplomatic List changed the status of unofficial Baltic
representatives in Washington to Chargés d’Affaires with Louis Seja representing Latvia as of
Sept 28 1922, Voldemaras čarneckis representing Lithuania as of October 11 1922, and Anthony
Piip representing Estonia as of Dec 31 1923.209
Conclusion
In the course of five years, a little known area of Western Russia became three
independent and fully recognized Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. To the U.S. and
other foreign powers, these states were previously unheard of and questions of independence
and de jure recognition unimaginable. Upon admission to the Russian Empire, they were
known as the territories of Swedish Estonia, Swedish Livonia, and the Duchy of Courland and
Semigallia.
Thanks to the self-determination principles feeding off of initial nationalistic aspirations,
Russia’s Baltic Provinces began pushing for independence. External intervention in the form of
World War I and the Russian Civil War wreaked havoc in a political, economic, and
humanitarian sense. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Versailles Peace Treaty, and the Russian
Civil War all created tremendous instability in the Baltic region by removing traces of Bolshevik,
White Russian, and German power. That same political instability allowed nationalist factions
to take the opportunity to declare their independence and then fight for it while also stopping
the United States from recognizing and supporting nationalistic ambitions.
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Without the turbulent events leading up to the end of the Russian Civil War in the Baltic
States, it is unlikely that nationalist groups would have been able to rise to power and form
independent governmental institutions. Power vacuums created by external intervention and
fluctuating hands of power during the Great War and both Russian Revolutions gave rise to
indigenous democratic governments by the time the Civil War ensued the region. During the
Civil War, the local governments were threatened by both White and Red Russian factions but
made their peace with the side that seemed to be winning, the Bolsheviks. Ultimately,
nationalist governments did establish themselves as legitimate powers in the Baltic States and
were able to transform their newfound situation enough to gain U.S. recognition.
The process of regional stabilization was reflected in the fight for U.S. recognition.
Domestic groups, private firms, and some U.S. government officials joined the Baltic States in
lobbying the State Department for assistance, whether it be military or political, in solidifying
the independence of the Baltic States. As time passed without any further external
interventions, Baltic governments were stable enough to overcome the last hurdles of U.S. nonrecognition policy due to the changing political landscape of America. By June of 1922,
Ambassador Bakhmetev had resigned, Secretary Lansing and President Wilson were out of
office, WWI definitively ended, the Russian Civil War was dwindling in favor of the Bolsheviks,
armed conflict in the Baltics died down after the 1920 Baltic-Soviet peace treaties, and the
international community had already extended either de jure or de facto recognition. Internal
stability in the hands of indigenous Baltic governments had formed out of the chaotic
conditions brought on by external intervention. That stability was confirmed by the last
influential Western power to extend de jure recognition on July 28, 1922. Although the Baltic
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States would once again become a part of Russia under the USSR, the interim period between
the two world wars did exist with independent Baltic governments. Memories and stories of
independence from a prior generation played a key role in the breakup of the Soviet Union,
especially during the Singing Revolutions on the Baltic littoral.
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